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Patty Gray was born in the midwestern United States, was educated at the Uni-
versity of Michigan, Ann Arbor (BA), and Southern Illinois University, Carbon-
dale (MA), and obtained her PhD in cultural anthropology from the University of 
Wisconsin, Madison. She joined MPISA in 2000 and was coordinator of the Sibe-
ria Projektgruppe in 2001–2002. She is now an assistant professor of anthropol-
ogy at the University of Alaska, Fairbanks. 
 
The project I carried out as part of the Siberia project group at MPISA 
was concerned with how the decollectivization of state farms in Russia 
and attendant changes in property relations were affecting the lived 
experience of rural residents. I conducted the bulk of my field research 
in reindeer-herding villages of Chukotka, a region in the Russian Far 
North. I also made an exploratory comparative field trip in 2001 to a 
farming village in the Republic of Mari El, in the Volga region. Scholars 
typically treat the Russian Far North and the Volga region as entirely 
separate frames of reference, but I wanted to demonstrate the similari-
ties the two regions shared on the basis of their having experienced 
processes of collectivization and decollectivization that were remarkably 
uniform throughout Russia (2003a). 
Chukotka has two main economic activities that are considered ‘agri-
cultural’: sea mammal hunting and reindeer herding. I focused on the 
latter. Reindeer are herded almost exclusively by indigenous inhabitants 
of Chukotka, who represent several distinct groups, primarily Chukchis, 
Chuvans, and Evens. Reindeer herding in Chukotka was progressively 
collectivized beginning in the late 1920s, until by the 1960s myriad in-
dividually owned and managed reindeer herds had been consolidated 
into twenty-eight sovkhozy, or state agricultural enterprises. Reindeer 
herders were no longer owners of the reindeer, nor were they managers; 
rather, they were salaried state employees who herded their reindeer 
according to a plan devised by ‘experts’ and handed down to them 
through their sovkhoz director (2003b). Individual herders and their 
family members might own a few head of reindeer; these were typically 
earned as bonuses from the sovkhoz or won as prizes in various socialist 
competitions, and they could be gifted and passed on as inheritance. In 
contrast to other parts of the Russian North, such as Yamal in western 
Siberia, in Chukotka such privately owned reindeer composed only a 
small proportion of the herds – about 5% throughout the late Soviet 
period (Gray and Stammler 2002a, 2002b). Because these reindeer were 
pastured collectively with sovkhoz herds, many of their owners were 
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confused over how many reindeer actually belonged to them (forthcom-
ing a). 
Thus, by the time of the collapse of state socialism in Russia in 1989, 
an entire generation of reindeer herders had come of age in Chukotka 
taking socialist property relations for granted. They did not aspire to 
become independent owners of reindeer herds; their aspirations were 
within the given system – to attend a technical college and become 
trained as a veterinary specialist, or to work up to becoming the brigadir 
of a herd. Few indigenous Chukotkans ever broke into the management 
tier of the sovkhoz system, which included the director and his deputy, 
the economist, the accountant, and various other specialists (2003b). 
Herders themselves, however, were relatively well paid. Not only did 
they have buying power in their villages, but they were often granted 
economic privileges – for example, they might be given an option to 
purchase scarce goods such as furniture, or, later in the Soviet period, 
televisions. Although they worked in the tundra, they had state-
provided apartments in the village to which they returned as a home 
base. School-age children and other family members usually spent most 
of the year in these settlements. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic privatization pro-
grams that followed in its wake came as a shock to all state farm em-
ployees in Chukotka. Ideally, it meant that reindeer herders could now 
become owners of their own herds, and some indigenous activists 
hailed the change as a return to the property relations indigenous peo-
ple had known before Soviet collectivization. In practice, it meant that 
state subsidy of reindeer herding abruptly stopped, and with it the regu-
lar salary that reindeer herders had taken for granted their entire lives. 
Very few herders privatized their own reindeer herds, and of those who 
did, virtually all lost their herds within a few years. 
Decollectivization of sovkhozy proceeded in Chukotka much as it did 
elsewhere in Russia: gatherings of sovkhoz employees were convened, a 
prescribed set of optional property forms was considered, and a decision 
was taken by a vote of the employees. In most cases, the vote was to 
allow the sovkhoz to remain essentially unchanged and simply reregister 
it with a new name. In the case of one village I studied, the word sovk-
hoz was even retained in the official name of the enterprise. The one 
thing not controlled by a vote of the employees was the process of strip-
ping the sovkhoz of all assets and functions that were not immediately 
relevant to its economic purpose of reindeer meat production. The sovk-
hoz director had once presided over a miniature empire in the village, 
being responsible for utilities (water, heat, electricity), schools, medical 
facilities, stores and warehouses, the village cafeteria, the library and 
‘house of culture’, and so forth. One by one these functions were di-
vorced from the sovkhoz and turned over to other administrative agen-
cies. The remaining ‘rump sovkhoz’ was then further stripped of eco-
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nomic assets, in an unplanned way, as some employees opted to leave 
its employ altogether. Each employee was entitled to take out a share 
commensurate with the number of years worked and salary level 
achieved. A pattern emerged in which non-indigenous village residents 
– usually those working at the managerial level of the sovkhoz – took out 
their shares in the form of assets such as heavy machinery (tractors). 
They then sold those assets for cash and used the cash to assist in their 
outmigration from the region. 
Generally, the sovkhozy that remained intact were the most successful 
in the long run, for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was that 
the regional administration looked most favourably upon this form and 
provided it with the most assistance. Nevertheless, in several cases a 
small group of reindeer herders, often relatives, opted to break off from 
the main sovkhoz and register themselves as an independent, collective 
enterprise. By the mid-1990s, what had previously appeared on the 
books as 28 consolidated sovkhozy now appeared as 57 small, scattered 
enterprises (2003b). After breaking away, these small enterprises were 
immediately faced with the problem of how to attend to basic needs 
that had always been provided by the sovkhoz – such as supplying them-
selves with food and other necessities and transporting meat for sale to 
markets. They also had to pay themselves a salary out of their own pro-
ceeds; given the difficulties of accessing markets, this meant in practice 
that they received no salary whatsoever. 
I observed two different outcomes of such attempts at independence 
in the two villages where I conducted fieldwork. In one case, the inde-
pendent herding operation simply gave up after about a year and re-
joined the rump sovkhoz. The leader of that venture, a Chukchi man, was 
later elected director of the entire sovkhoz. While he enjoyed personal 
upward mobility, his employees remained, up to the end of my project 
period (December 2002), without any cash salary, and many were in 
debt to the sovkhoz for foodstuffs taken on credit (2003a). In the other 
village, several family groups had banded together and hired a Russian 
manager to handle their finances and solve the problems of accessing 
markets. Within a couple of years, the manager embezzled these fami-
lies’ funds and fled from Chukotka (forthcoming b). These two scenar-
ios were typical of the fates of reindeer herders who attempted to ven-
ture away from the safety of the sovkhoz. 
Toward the end of the 1990s, two significant and somewhat opposed 
developments emerged. First, the Chukotka regional department of 
agriculture developed a plan to ‘municipalize’ reindeer herding in the 
region, meaning that at least 51% of the property of each enterprise – 
from the large sovkhozy to the smaller, independent enterprises – would 
be signed over to one of Chukotka’s eight municipal districts. This was 
to be done ‘voluntarily’, although reports abounded of reindeer herders 
being strong-armed into signing over their assets with the warning that 
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if they refused, they would be completely cut off from support and as-
sistance. Although some officials argued that this new arrangement 
would benefit the reindeer herders, the impetus seemed to stem primar-
ily from the (now former) governor’s obsessive aspiration to maintain 
all political and economic activity in the region under his tight control. 
The head of the department of agriculture himself told me in an inter-
view that people needed to get things back to the way they were in So-
viet times, when a single director controlled the sovkhoz (and was in 
turn more easily controlled by higher-ups). By the end of municipaliza-
tion, the figure of 57 independent enterprises that had appeared during 
decollectivization had again been brought down to the Soviet-era figure 
of 28 registered on paper. The others had either dissolved, merged into 
the larger sovkhozy, or been written out of existence administratively 
(while their actual fate remained ambiguous). 
Second, a quite different development arose when Russian federal law 
made available only to indigenous inhabitants an alternative set of 
property relations associated with an organizational form called an 
obshchina (‘community’). Obshchiny, in combination with existing regu-
lations on long-term leasing of land, allowed indigenous reindeer herd-
ers theoretically to opt out of the municipalization scheme and remain 
entitled to governmental support. Obshchiny had actually been success-
fully established all across the Russian North since 1992, when the 
Sakha Republic set a precedent by issuing a local law about them; but of 
the three attempts in Chukotka to establish obshchiny that I know of, all 
met with resistance from the regional administration and were effec-
tively disabled (2001). A federal law on obshchiny passed in 2000 opened 
up new opportunities for Chukotkans to experiment with this form. 
Although it still faced administrative resistance, by the end of my pro-
ject an ‘obshchina movement’ seemed to be gaining ground. 
The common theme running through my research in Chukotka was 
that increasing inequality was tied not only to changing property rela-
tions but also to changing regional politics, which in turn were tied to 
the changing political economy of Russia (2000). One unfortunate con-
clusion that emerged was that privatization and democratization were 
anything but liberating for the rural residents of Chukotka. 
